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John Williamson (ed), I M F  Cond ition ality , Insti­
tute for International Economics, Washington 
DC, 1983.
A t a first glance IMF Conditionality may appear to be a rather flat, conservative and intellectually 
abstracted volume. Unlike the Arusha 
South-North Declaration of 1980 on 
the International Monetary System01 it 
offers no sketch for radical reconstruction 
Even in terms of systematic structural 
reform proposals within the existing 
IMF framework the Group of 24's 
Expert Group Report Low Income Countries 
and the International Monetary System(2), 
and Brandt II (Common Crisis)0) and 
the Commonwealth Secretariat's To­
wards a New Bretton Woods(4> are all 
crisper, easier to read and arguably 
more far reaching.
Indeed a perusal of the list of partici­
pants at the Institute for International 
Affairs' 1982 Conference from which 
the book came would suggest that -  
with a handful of exceptions -  the 
Fund (which was well represented 
together with the Bank) was among 
friends and friendly critics. This was a 
conference of respectable establishment 
academicians (many with practical ex­
perience) from Western Europe and 
North America plus a scattering of 
Third World academicians by no means 
clearly or on average more radical.
That is, however, precisely why IMF 
Conditionality is important. With no 
populists and few radicals the majority 
of the papers, discussants and summaries 
add up to a devastating, all the more so 
because very largely non-ideological, 
criticism of the Fund at all levels from 
strategic models through technical es­
timates and target ('trigger clause' or 
programme suspension) level setting 
,ind seasonal phasing.
The IMF's importance as several 
hapters indicate goes well beyond the 
i nnds it makes available in its facilities. 
On the financial side it is clear that 
commercial banks, bilateral aid agencies
and the World Bank view IMF pro­
gramme agreement asa necessary con­
dition prior to rescheduling debt and 
making additional credit available and/ 
or to expanding balance of payments 
support loans or inaugurating Structural 
Adjustment Programmes. Ironically 
this seems to be true of national 
agencies (e.g. SIDA) and of the World 
Bank who have significant differences 
in perspective from the Fund; differ­
ences it is far too simple to call com­
plementary (even though both Vice 
President William Dale and Senior 
Advisor Stanley Please did stress that 
aspect of what has since become an 
increasingly ambiguous interaction).
On the policy side the fact that the 
IMF does impose conditionality means 
that a programme can be expected to 
have positive or negative results which 
go beyond the direct impact of the 
external finance secured and may in 
fact be greater. This point is discussed 
by the editor in examining ways to 
evaluate the overall impact of IMF 
programmes.
Evaluation is important because even 
the IMF admits that a high proportion 
of all programmes fail to meet one or 
more of their targets (especially eco­
nomic growth and rates of inflation) 
and that many do not run their full 
course because binding quarterly re­
quire m e n ts (u s u a lly c ^
ernment and total domestic bank bor­
rowing, short and medium term ex­
ternal debt and external arrears) known 
as 'trigger clauses' are broken. To have 
most agreements fail on one or more 
key targets and barely half run their 
lives (despite the usually high cost to 
the borrower and the nuisance to the 
IMF of a breakdown) must raise 
questions about the appropriateness of 
policies, targets and trigger clauses. 
They cannot by themselves prove a 
negative as over 1979-83 few nationally 
set targets have been met either -  
economic management has been more 
noted for failure than success.
But the determination of several
countries -  highlighted in the chapters 
on Brazil and Tanzania and comments 
of Carlos Diaz-Alejandro -  to avoid 
going to or negotiating at great length 
without reaching agreement even when 
this has demonstrably had high costs 
does raise questions about the approp­
riateness of the IMF's approach. Its 
style is termed 'grandmotherly7 by 
Sidney Dell -  and not in the positive 
sense of that adjective. In his conclusion 
the editor views the problems arising 
from avoiding the Fund as long as 
possible because of disagreement with 
its approach as reflecting little credit on 
either borrowers or the Fund and as 
underlining the need for fuller and 
more open dialogue. ►
Jacques de Larosiere, IMF managing director, facing devastating criticism of the Fund
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GENERAL
The period of IMF programmes was 
queried by several participants including 
William Klein and G .K  Helleiner as 
was its preference for shock treatment
i.e. very large cuts in exchange rates, 
government deficits and real wages at 
the beginning of a programme. The 
problem in terms of length is that three 
years of drawings, a year of grace and 
five of repayment may not be adequate 
to allow structural adjustment especially 
if external shocks not likely to be 
reversed caused much of the imbalance 
and a stagnant world economy hampers 
building up of new exports. The 'front 
and loading” or shock approach has 
somewhat different problems. It may 
maximise initial inflation and/or make 
it harder to bring under control (a case 
assessed somewhat sceptically by Klein). 
It certainly makes accepting IMF pro­
grammes more difficult for representa­
tive governments to accept because 
they entail substantial suffering long 
before any gains are visible. The IMF is 
well aware of this -  at a previous 
meeting a senior official remarked that 
few democratic governments ever 
adopted a really rigorous IMF pro­
gramme and none survived serious 
attempts to implement one. However, 
the IMF (in David Finch's presentation) 
and two academic participants (Pro­
fessor Mikeswell from the USA and 
Professor Okyor from Turkey) reso­
lutely defended shock tactics as neces­
sary to cause a break with the past and 
allow a new start
There was -  apart perhaps from 
Fund participants -  fairly general agree­
ment that IMF programmes were rarely 
large enough to allow major changes in 
policy to be implemented rapidly with­
out high domestic costs. However, this 
is not per se the Fund's fault -  the 
increases in quotas have been slower 
and smaller than its staff would have 
preferred. This point evidently inter­
acts with the question of programme 
duration -  the money for a maximum 
programme length of five years of 
drawings, two of grace and eight of 
repayment is not available. Indeed as 
late 1983 events — including a Fund 
moratorium on new programmes -  
illustrated, the combination of present 
levels of Fund resources, present depth 
of global recession and present levels 
of Third World external debt already 
overtaxes the resources available to the 
Fund.
The IMF's fairly explicit model of
Oil rig in Nigeria; special facility created in the wake of the oil crisis
imbalances (domestic and external) as 
caused by unsustainable expansion of 
demand, curable by demand cuts (es­
pecially cuts in governm ent spending 
and real wages), and achievable fairly 
quickly and permanently by altering the 
use of real resources and capacity was 
queried. It was suggested that it did 
apply to several cases (e.g. Italy, UK, 
probably Portugal and Turkey) but 
less fully to a majority. The assumption 
of ease in shifting resources from 
domestic consumption to export gen­
eration was viewed as particularly 
questionable in the Third World. In 
addition, even in the industrial econ­
omy cases, a common pattern (as noted 
by the editor in his concluding chapter 
was "stabilisation without adjustm ent" 
In these cases the symptoms of im­
balance were cured by massive deflation 
but almost as soon as the programme 
ended they reemerged suggesting that
there were deeper structural causes 
which had not been tackled.
The IMF participants, to a certain 
extent, agreed that many Third World 
external balance crises since 1973 have 
been caused in large part by external 
shocks which reduced national com­
mand over real resources and, in par­
ticular, imports. However, the case 
made by several authors that such an 
imbalance needed to be treated more 
by measures to enhance supply (in­
cluding exports) and less by cutting 
demand appeared to be seen by the 
Fund as irrelevent On the one hand 
they argued that a permanent structural 
imbalance -  however caused -  required 
adjustment (with which no contributor 
would seem to have disagreed) and on 
the other that supply enhancem ent 
was the Bank's worry not the Fund's 
This represents a hardening of position 
since 1973/74 when in the wake of the
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first oil shock a special low condition­
ality Oil Facility was created and access 
to the Compensatory Finance Facility 
(to offset export shortfalls) significantly 
eased No similar measures followed the 
second oil shock of 1979/80. Since the 
IMF has increasingly stressed the need 
for trade-led recovery, there would 
appear to be a contradiction with its 
imposition of import cuts in a substantial 
number of programmes and with its 
reducing net drawings in 1982 as the 
recession reached its trough.
While the Fund Bank (especially 
Structural Adjustment Programmes) 
relationship was described as a marriage 
of macro fiscal and monetary control to 
real output orientated sectoral policy 
and management, the union appeared 
problematic to some participants. The 
Bank's supply enhancing approach 
seemed to require a longer time span, 
less disruptive initial shocks and a 
rather less macro monetary focus of 
attention than the Fund programmes 
usually provided for -  albeit in one 
case the Bank refused a SAP because it 
felt the Fund's requirements of Tan­
zania had been too lenient and in 
another India appeared to have drawn 
on the Fund for purposes which related 
more to a SAP model than to any 
urgent need for short term imbalance 
reduction. Since 1982 -  especially in 
relation to sub-Saharan Africa -  the 
Bank appears to have had increasing 
doubts about some Fund prescriptions 
(including massive initial versus phased 
devaluations) and has viewed raising 
imports to levels consistent with more 
adequate maintenance and utilisation 
of existing capacity as a key elem ent in 
stabilisation and structural adjustment 
whereas the Fund still treats import 
levels as a residual.
No contributor argues against there 
being some conditions. Nor does any 
believe that these should not include 
targets related to reducing external 
imbalance. Beyond that there is very 
considerable disagreement. Som e -  in 
general liberal -  participants argued 
for additional IMF conditions in respect 
to growth and income distribution.
lie evident purpose of such conditions 
would be to bind the IMF (as well as 
he borrower) to limit demand cutting 
nd to protect weaker social and eco- 
inic sub-classes. More conservative 
rticipants tended to believe IMF 
nditions were about right in type but 
rhaps not strict enough. Several
liberals and radicals (including Pro­
fessors Flelleiner, Bergsten, Williamson 
and Diaz-Alejandro) wanted less con­
ditions in the sense that the IMF should 
normally set only external balance re­
covery targets and not additional do­
mestic targets limiting the means the 
borrowing country used to achieve the 
external balance improvement require­
ments.
The technical side of programme 
drafting came under attack from a 
surprisingly wide range of participants 
including neo-liberal monetarists (e.g. 
Professor Harberger) as well as centrists 
and liberals (e.g. Professors Klein, 
Williamson, Helleiner). Fund project­
ions, especially in poor countries and 
during periods of global economic un­
certainty, are subject to a wide margin
"The whole situation 
has worsened.
But the IMF has 
not taken any of 
the criticisms 
or suggestions on 
board."
of error. This is doubly true when 
programmes included major initial 
shock elements. Single point project­
ions for inflation, terms of trade, export 
volume, government revenue and bank 
borrowing are unlikely to be accurate. 
Under existing conditions this is inev­
itable -  albeit, as Professor Helleiner 
has argued more forcefully elsewhere, 
the quality of Fund personnel and 
analysis deployed in sub-Saharan 
Africa often compounds the inevitable 
levels of imprecision and inaccuracy.
The problem is that Fund programmes 
include fixed quarterly targets breaking 
which normally terminates the pro­
gramme. (A majority of the Third World 
cases presented include at least one 
'busted' programme). Because they are 
quarterly the uncertainty problem is 
compounded — in some case pro­
grammes that arguably would have
been on target at the end of the year 
collapsed because seasonal or stochastic 
quarterly savings broke an earlier 
ceiling.
The consensus (as expressed in the 
closing panel and the editor's concluding 
chapter) among non-IMF participants 
was for a different approach to target 
fixing in three senses. First, where 
possible ranges rather than single points 
might be set. Second, the assumptions 
underlying the targets should be spelled 
out along with simple formulas for 
adjusting ceilings i f -  for reasons wholly 
or largely beyond the borrowers' con­
trol -  the ex ante assumptions proved 
significantly divergent from ex post re­
ality. Third, there should be more 
flexibility on the IMF side in agreeing 
to waive ceilings when significant pro­
gress had been achieved and the bor­
rower was demonstrably making major 
efforts to achieve adjustm ent Unfor­
tunately, judging by subsequent IMF 
performance, even this non-ideological 
set of proposals based on a demon­
strable set of technical problems fall on 
deaf ears.
This is not a comfortable book While 
the IMF certainly changed its posture 
by taking part in such an intellectual 
forum (it does not appear actually to 
have engaged in dialogue, whereas 
Bank participants did), one wonders 
why. Each of the criticisms made -  all 
by serious practitioners and/or acade­
micians who neither reject conditionality 
as such nor disagree that imbalances 
must be cured within a finite period -  
remains valid today. Indeed the situation 
has worsened. But the IMF has not 
taken any of the criticisms or suggestions 
on board; it apparently remains con­
vinced (at least at operational level) 
that distaste for approaching it, dis­
agreement with its analysis and con­
ditions and failed programmes are 
wholly the result of the errors of others 
(or of unpleasant unalterable economic 
conditions) and not the result of mistakes 
or rigidities within the IMF. ■
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